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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Katie Jo Meyer appeals the district court’s order revoking her probation. On appeal,
and for the first time, Meyer argues that the district court’s application of a substantial
evidence standard at the revocation hearing violated her right to due process.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On February 10, 2016, Katie Jo Meyer pled guilty to unlawful possession of a
controlled substance. (R., pp.25-26, 30.) On April 13, 2016, the district court sentenced
Meyer to incarceration for one and one-half years fixed and five and one-half years
indeterminate, suspended the sentence, and placed her on probation for seven years. (R.,
pp.42-47.) As a condition of her probation, Meyer was “to take all medication prescribed
at the rate it is prescribed.” (R., p.45.)
On September 20, 2016, the state filed a motion for probation violation in the
district court alleging that Meyer violated a condition of her probation by failing to stay on
her prescribed medications. (R., p.70-71.1) A hearing was held on the alleged probation
violations on March 20, 2017. (R., p.95.) At the start of the hearing, the district court told
Meyer that “the burden is on the State to prove these probation violations by substantial
evidence[,] [b]ut it is a court that is going to make the determination of whether or not the
probation terms have been violated.” (Tr., p.30, Ls.15-23. 2) Meyer did not object to the
district court’s articulation of the state’s evidentiary burden.
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The state also alleged that Meyer violated a condition of her probation by failing to check
herself in to Intermountain Hospital as instructed by her supervising officer. (R., p.70-71.)
The district court dismissed this alleged violation. (R., p.95.) It is not part of this appeal.
2
All transcript citations are to the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on March 20,
2017.
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The state’s first witness was Meyer’s father. (Tr., p.32, Ls.6-16.) He testified that,
in 2016, Meyer had been living “off and on” in his house with her parents, sister, and son.
(Tr., p.32, L.25 – p.33, L.6.)

He also testified that Meyer had been prescribed

antidepressant medication. (Tr., p.33, Ls.13-17.) He became concerned that she was not
taking her medication because he noticed a distinct change in Meyer: “she was normal,
could comprehend[,] [a]nd then after a while she couldn’t. She couldn’t comprehend
anything.” (Tr., p.33, L.23 – p.34, L.10.) He first noticed this change in her behavior in
June 2016. (Tr., p.34, Ls.11-16.) He testified that he didn’t “know how to explain it”
because he is “not a doctor” but “[s]he just wasn’t herself.” (Tr., p.36, Ls.1-7.)
He had conversations with Meyer about her medication. (Tr., p.36, Ls.8-10.)
“Sometimes it was none of our business and sometimes she wanted to talk about it.” (Tr.,
p.36, Ls.11-14.) He testified that, in some of those conversations, Meyer acknowledged
she was not taking the prescribed medicine. (Tr., p.36, Ls.15-17.)
He reported to Meyer’s probation officer, Officer Hardy, that he was concerned
about Meyer’s behavior. (Tr., p.34, Ls.17-22.) He told Officer Hardy that Meyer “was
angry and she was talking stuff that we’ve never heard before.” (Tr., p.34, L.23 – p.35,
L.1.) He testified that, in her anger, Meyer had made threats regarding other members of
her family, including a threat “about beating her [Meyer’s sister] up and same as my wife.”
(Tr., p.35, Ls.5-10.)
The state’s second witness was Officer Hardy.

He testified that he began

supervising Meyer in June 2016. (Tr., p.39, Ls.4-7.) He had concerns about Meyer’s wellbeing after first meeting with her because “[s]he did not properly communicate.” (Tr.,
p.40, Ls.2-11.) Even when he “would ask her simple and direct questions” she was
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“looking at me and shrugging her shoulders without a response”—“it was as if she almost
wasn’t even there mentally.” (Tr., p.40, Ls.6-11.) Hardy testified that he “believe[d]
[Meyer] was prescribed Celexa, but she stated that she was not taking it and she didn’t need
mental health medications.” (Tr., p.40, Ls.19-24.)
Hardy confirmed that Meyer’s father called him on September 12, 2016, to voice
concerns regarding Meyer’s mental health. (Tr., p.41, Ls.4-11.) Hardy subsequently met
with Meyer in his office. (Tr., p.41, Ls.19-23.) Meyer was “[d]isoriented.” (Tr., p.42,
Ls.11-18.) Hardy “would ask her a direct question and her answers made absolutely no
sense at all.” (Id.) He asked her if she was taking mental health medications, and “[s]he
said no, she’s not. She felt she didn’t need to take medications.” (Tr., p.42, Ls.19-25.)
“She said she had no intention of taking them.” (Tr., p.43, Ls.1-4.)
Hardy testified that, subsequent to their meeting, Meyer ended up at State Hospital
South. (Tr., p.50, Ls.3-6.) He met with her after she spent some time at the hospital and
before the hearing. (Tr., p.50, Ls.7-9.) Hardy could “[a]bsolutely” tell a difference in
Meyer’s behavior. (Tr., p.50, Ls.10-13.) He confirmed that, at the time of the hearing,
Meyer was “making rational decisions and knows exactly what she is doing,” and that
“[s]he is much better.” (Tr., p.50, Ls.14-19.)
The district court gave Meyer the opportunity to call witnesses, but she did not call
any. (Tr., p.51, Ls.8-9.) In claiming that the state failed to meet its burden, Meyer argued
that “this comes down to [] willfulness.” (Tr., p.52, L.25 – p.53, L.11.) Meyer argued to
the district court that she was not capable of rational thought when she stopped taking the
prescribed medications, which meant that any violation of her probation condition could
not have been willful. (See
- - Tr., p.52, L.25 – p.55, L.1.)

3

The district court disagreed. (Tr., p.55, L.11 – p.58, L.16.) The district court found
that “the defendant clearly had admitted to her father and to her probation officer that she
previously from approximately June of 2016 knew she was supposed to be on her meds
and intentionally and willfully decided not to take her meds.” (Tr., p.56, L.20 – p.57, L.4.)
“So while her mental state was somewhat nonresponsive and she was disoriented, it does
not appear to the Court that when testifying in regarding taking of her meds that there was
any mental confusion on her part.” (Tr., p.57, L.12-16.) The district court found that
Meyer’s refusal to take her prescription medications constituted a willful violation of a
condition of her probation. (Tr., p.56, Ls.7-19; p.58, Ls.10-16.)
In discussing its findings, the district court stated that it “needs to determine if there
is substantial evidence to show that the defendant failed to stay on her prescribed
medications.” (Tr., p.57, Ls.12-22.) And in announcing its finding of a violation, the
district court stated that “the State has produced substantial evidence that this defendant
has violated condition one of failing to take your medications as prescribed and ordered by
this Court.” (Tr., p.58, 10-16.) Meyer did not object to the district court’s articulation of
a substantial evidence standard on either occasion.
After a disposition hearing on March 29, 2017, the district court revoked and then
immediately reinstated Meyer’s probation. (R., pp.98-99.) Meyer timely appealed the
revocation of her probation. (R., pp.102-04.)
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ISSUES
Meyer states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it applied an impermissibly
low evidentiary standard – requiring less than a preponderance of the
evidence – to find Ms. Meyer violated her probation?
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
I.

Is this appeal moot because the district court reinstated Meyer’s probation?

II.

Has Meyer failed to show that the district court’s use of a substantial evidence
standard in a probation revocation proceeding constitutes fundamental error?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
This Appeal Is Moot Because The District Court Reinstated Meyer’s Probation
A.

Introduction
This appeal is moot and should be dismissed. Meyer appeals the district court’s

revocation of her probation, but the only action the district court took after revoking
Meyer’s probation was to immediately reinstate it. This means that, regardless of the
judicial decision on appeal, Meyer finds herself in the exact same position: on probation.
Although the finding of a probation violation typically has collateral
consequences—it prevents a defendant from seeking any statutory relief under Idaho Code
§ 19-2604 from their conviction or sentence—no collateral consequences exist for Meyer
because she is not eligible for relief under that statute regardless of the outcome of her
appeal. Even if Meyer wins a favorable decision on appeal, she is still ineligible for relief
under the statute because, after the district court reinstated her probation for the violation
at issue here, Meyer admitted to other probation violations. As a result, the district court
found she violated her probation. Meyer did not appeal that decision, and the 42-day
deadline to file an appeal has long-since passed, which means she is permanently ineligible
to seek relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604 from her original conviction or sentence.
Because this appeal cannot possibly provide Meyer any relief, it is moot.
B.

Standard Of Review
“This Court may dismiss an appeal when it appears that the case involves only a

moot question.” State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 419, 272 P.3d 382, 391 (2011)
(quoting Goodson v. Nez Perce Cnty. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993
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P.2d 614, 616 (2000)). “Justiciability issues, such as mootness, are freely reviewed.” State
v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010).
C.

This Appeal Is Moot Because A Favorable Judicial Decision Would Not Result In
Any Relief To Meyer
This appeal is moot because the district court reinstated Meyer’s probation. “An

issue is moot . . . if ‘a favorable judicial decision would not result in any relief.’” State v.
Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 462, 348 P.3d 1, 77 (2014) (quoting Arambarri v. Armstrong,
152 Idaho 734, 739, 274 P.3d 1249, 1254 (2012)). Meyer would not receive any relief
from a favorable decision here because, regardless of the decision on appeal, Meyer will
find herself in the exact same position: on probation. Indeed, the very same order that
revoked Meyer’s probation (and from which she now appeals) reinstated her probation
“upon the same terms and conditions” originally imposed by the district court when Meyer
was first sentenced. 3 (R., 98-99.) The only issue on appeal is thus moot, and this Court
should therefore dismiss the appeal. See Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 419, 272 P.3d at 391.
Citing Idaho Code § 19-2604, Meyer argues this appeal is not moot because “there
are collateral consequences to an order revoking probation.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5 n.1.)
That section of the Idaho Code allows a defendant to apply to have their plea or conviction
set aside, their conviction lowered from a felony to a misdemeanor, or for other relief from
their conviction or sentence, so long as the “the court did not find, and the defendant did
not admit, . . . that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of any probation.”
I.C. § 19-2604(1)(b). Presumably, Meyer’s argument is that this appeal is not moot

3

The district court did amend the original conditions but only to include a “clarification”
of “previously ordered special condition(s).” (R., p.98-99 (emphasis added).) The
amendment did not add any new conditions or requirements.
7

because, if this Court renders a decision in her favor, she will regain the eligibility to apply
for relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604. (See Appellant’s brief, p.5 n.1.) That is incorrect.
After the district court reinstated Meyer’s probation for the probation violation at
issue here, Meyer again violated the terms of her probation. On August 16, 2017, Meyer
admitted that she committed multiple probation violations. (Aug., pp.10-11. 4) On October
6, 2017, the district court “found that the Defendant was in violation of probation,” revoked
Meyer’s probation, and reinstated probation with additional conditions. (Aug., pp.12-15.)
The district court’s order revoking and reinstating probation became final 42 days later
because Meyer did not file an appeal. See I.A.R. 14.
Meyer’s admissions of probation violations in August 2017 and the district court’s
finding of a probation violation in October 2017 permanently disqualify Meyer from
seeking any relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604 from her original conviction or sentence.
This means, regardless of the outcome of this appeal, Meyer is ineligible to seek relief
under the statute. A judicial decision here in Meyer’s favor would therefore not result in
any relief, and the appeal is thus moot. See Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 462, 348 P.3d at 77.

II.
Meyer Did Not Raise Her Sole Argument Until Appeal And Has Failed To Show The
Use Of A Substantial Evidence Standard Constituted Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
Even if this Court reaches the merits, Meyer has failed to show reversible error.

Meyer’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court violated her right to due process

4

Contemporaneous with the filing of this brief, the state has filed a motion to augment the
record with a copy of the Court Minutes recording Meyer’s admissions and the subsequent
order from the district court revoking and reinstating Meyer on probation.
8

by applying a substantial evidence standard at the probation revocation hearing. The
district court never heard that argument and never had an opportunity to correct the alleged
error because Meyer did not object to the standard at any time during the revocation
hearing. That places on Meyer the burden of proving fundamental error—a burden she
cannot carry.
First, Meyer cannot show a constitutional violation because the standard applied by
the district court at the revocation hearing satisfied due process. A probation revocation
hearing is an informal hearing with minimal due process requirements. For the standard
of proof, due process requires only that the evidence presented show more than probable
cause and that the district court conduct a final evaluation of the contested facts. The
substantial evidence standard, which requires a full evaluation of the record and a decision
with which reasonable minds can agree, satisfies these requirements.
Second, Meyer essentially (and correctly) concedes that the alleged error is not
plain because “this Court has not articulated the degree of proof that will satisfy the court.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.9.) She has provided no case—state or federal—that has held that
application of a substantial evidence standard at a probation revocation hearing violates
due process.
Third, Meyer has failed to show the alleged error affected the outcome of the
probation violation hearing because the state presented evidence showing, even by a
preponderance standard, that Meyer willfully violated a condition of her probation. It is
undisputed that Meyer had to take any medicine prescribed to her as a condition of her
probation. Both Meyer’s father and probation officer testified that she was on prescription
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medication, that she told them she stopped taking the prescription medication, and that a
distinct change in her behavior coincided with these admissions.
B.

Standard Of Review
Meyer erroneously asserts that the standard of review is the typical “two-step

analysis” for probation revocation. (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) Although that would have
been the proper standard had Meyer lodged a contemporaneous objection to the alleged
error below, her failure to do so means that the fundamental error test is the proper standard.
See State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 174, 307 P.3d 187, 191 (2013).
It is black letter law in Idaho that where an “alleged error was not followed by a
contemporaneous objection, it shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho’s
fundamental error doctrine.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2008).
“[T]he fundamental error test is the proper standard for determining whether an appellate
court may hear claims based upon unobjected-to error in all phases of criminal proceedings
in the trial courts of this state.” Carter, 155 Idaho at 174, 307 P.3d at 191 (emphasis added).
This includes claims based upon unobjected-to error in probation proceedings. See State
v. Travis, 125 Idaho 1, 3, 867 P.2d 234, 236 (1994) (applying fundamental error test where
issues were not properly raised at probation revocation hearing); State v. Knowlton, 123
Idaho 916, 918, 854 P.2d 259, 261 (1993) (same); State v. Reine, 122 Idaho 928, 929-30,
841 P.2d 458, 459-60 (1992) (same); -see --also --------State v. Gibbs, 162 Idaho 782, ___, 405 P.3d
567, 570 (2017) (applying fundamental error test in context of district court’s modification
of defendant’s probation).
The Idaho Supreme Court has provided numerous justifications for application of
the fundamental error doctrine in the case of an unpreserved claim. “Ordinarily, the trial
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court is in the best position to determine the relevant facts and to adjudicate the dispute.”
Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. “‘In the case of an actual or invited procedural
error, the [trial] court can often correct or avoid the mistake so that it cannot possibly affect
the ultimate outcome.’” Id. (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009)
(brackets in original)). “Furthermore, requiring a contemporaneous objection prevents the
litigant from sandbagging the court, i.e., ‘remaining silent about his objection and belatedly
raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor.’” Id. (quoting Puckett, 556
U.S. at 134). These rationales apply just as readily in the probation revocation context as
they do in other phases of criminal proceedings, as demonstrated by the Idaho Supreme
Court’s application of the fundamental error doctrine in the probation revocation context.
See Travis, 125 Idaho at 3, 867 P.2d at 236; Knowlton, 123 Idaho at 918, 854 P.2d at 261;
Reine, 122 Idaho at 929-30, 841 P.2d at 459-60.
In a recent published decision, the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected the state’s
contention that an appeal from a revocation of probation should have been reviewed only
for fundamental error. See State v. Clausen, 163 Idaho 180, ___, 408 P.3d 935, 937-38
(Ct. App. 2017). The court stated that “[t]he fundamental error analysis articulated in
[Perry] did not replace the abuse of discretion standard applicable to claims that a district
court erred in revoking probation.” Id. That is true as a general statement—assuming the
defendant contemporaneously objected to the alleged error below. But to the extent
Clausen suggests that the fundamental error doctrine does not apply to an issue arising
from a probation revocation hearing even when the defendant failed to object to the alleged
error below, it is not binding on any court because it conflicts with Idaho Supreme Court
precedent. See Hausladen v. Knoche, 159 Idaho 358, 362, 360 P.3d 367, 371 (Ct. App.
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2015) (“[W]e are bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court when there is a
conflict between its decisions and ours.”).
Despite the district court stating multiple times during the revocation hearing that
it was applying a substantial evidence standard, Meyer did not object a single time to that
standard. (See Tr., p.30, Ls.15-23; p.56, Ls.1-6; p.57, Ls.20-22; p.58, Ls.10-16.) She now
argues on appeal, for the first time, that the district court violated her due process rights by
using a standard lower than a preponderance of the evidence. (See Appellant’s brief, p.910.) Pursuant to Idaho Supreme Court precedent, that unobjected-to alleged error “shall
only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho’s fundamental error doctrine.” Perry,
150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980; see Carter, 155 Idaho at 174, 307 P.3d at 191.
C.

Meyer Cannot Show Fundamental Error
Meyer cannot carry her burden on fundamental error review. Fundamental error

review requires Meyer to show that the alleged error (1) violated a constitutional right; (2)
plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
She cannot make any of these showings.
1. Meyer Cannot Show That The District Court Violated Due Process By Applying
The Substantial Evidence Standard
Meyer cannot show that the district court’s use of a substantial evidence standard
in her probation revocation hearing violated her right to due process. The United States
Supreme Court has “established minimum due process requirements for probation and
parole revocation proceedings.” State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766, 171 P.3d 253, 257
(2007) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 782 (1973)). All that due process requires with respect to a standard of proof is
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“a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts” that amounts to “more than determining
probable cause.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488.
The substantial evidence standard applied by the district court satisfied due process.
A court applying the substantial evidence standard must determine, after evaluating all of
the evidence, if the evidence presented is “of such sufficient quantity and probative value
that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder.” Chisholm v.
Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 142 Idaho 159, 164, 125 P.3d 515, 520 (2005). Substantial
evidence requires a full evaluation of the record: the court “should not read only one side
of the case” or “ignore the record to the contrary.” Ewins v. Allied Security, 138 Idaho
343, 346, 63 P.3d 469, 472 (2002). That is “a final evaluation of any contested relevant
facts” that amounts to more than determining probable cause. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488.
Morrissey requires nothing more.
The district court applied the substantial evidence standard by considering all of the
evidence presented and resolving all factual disputes. After the state and Meyer both had
the opportunity to put on evidence, the only contested relevant fact was whether Meyer
was “capable of rational thought” such that she was “capable of making a willful choice”
when she stopped taking her medications. (Tr., p.52, L.25 – p.55, L.1.) The district court
evaluated that contested fact on the record, resolved it with certainty as a factual matter
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(i.e., more than probable cause), 5 and supported its conclusion by citing specific evidence
in the record. (Tr., p.56, L.20 – p.58, L.9.)
Specifically, the district court found that there was not “any mental confusion on
[Meyer’s] part” based on the facts that she “clearly had admitted to her father and her
probation officer that she previously . . . knew she was supposed to be on her meds and
intentionally and willfully decided not to take her meds”; that “this was not a position that
was new on September 13th, but a position of the defendant that had developed since earlier
that summer”; and that “even on the day of the 13th, the defendant specifically admitted to
the probation officer that she was not taking her meds and did not need to take the meds
and had no intention of taking her medicine.” (Tr., p.56, L.20 – p.57, L.22.) The district
court’s factual findings and conclusions, determined after both sides had an opportunity to
present their evidence, constituted a “final evaluation of any contested relevant facts” that
went beyond “determining probable cause.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488. That is all due
process requires.
That Meyer’s revocation hearing satisfied due process is supported by the
“reasonably satisfied” standard of proof applied in numerous jurisdictions across the
country, including a majority of the federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Colasuonno,
697 F.3d 164, 180-81 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[A] district court need only be ‘reasonably satisfied’

5

Nothing in the district court’s evaluation suggests the court reached its conclusions by
relying on probabilities or presumptions. See State v. Williams, 162 Idaho 56, ___, 394
P.3d 99, 109 (Ct. App. 2016) (“Probable cause is the possession of information that would
lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong
presumption that a person they have placed under arrest is guilty of a crime.” State v.
Carlson, 134 Idaho 471, 478, 4 P.3d 1122, 1129 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Probable cause is a fluid
concept, ‘turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.’”
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
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that a probationer has failed to comply with the conditions of probation to revoke
sentence.”); In re Morrissey, 305 F.3d 211, 218 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[R]easonably satisfied is
the standard of proof in a probation revocation proceeding.”); United States v. Guadarrama,
742 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The standard of proof required is that the evidence and
facts be such as reasonably satisfy the judge that the probationer’s conduct has not been as
required by the conditions of probation.”). Although most courts have not set a specific
quantum of evidence required to “reasonably satisf[y]” the district court, they have
instructed that it “requires little evidence,” United States v. Hopson, 39 F.3d 795, 801 (7th
Cir. 1994), that it does not require a “preponderance of the evidence,” -id., --see -------Dail v. State,
610 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Nev. 1980), and that “[p]robably evidence rising to the level of
substantial evidence is not even required, absent arbitrary and capricious action in the
revocation,” United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1975).
The substantial evidence standard applied by the district court is no different than
the reasonably satisfied standard in any constitutionally meaningful way. Neither requires
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Chisholm, 142 Idaho at 164, 125 P.3d at
520; Hopson, 39 F.3d at 801. Both are based on reasonableness. See Colasuonno, 697
F.3d at 180-81; Chisholm, 142 Idaho at 164, 125 P.3d at 520. The substantial evidence
standard requires that the evidence presented “be of such sufficient quantity and probative
value that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder.” Chisholm,
142 Idaho at 164, 125 P.3d at 520 (emphasis added). The “reasonably satisfied” standard
requires, as the name implies, that the evidence presented reasonably satisfy the district
court. See Colasuonno, 697 F.3d at 180-81. The district court’s application of a standard
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that is indistinguishable, as a constitutional matter, from the standard applied in the
majority of federal courts could not have violated Meyer’s right to due process.
Meyer argues that due process required the district court to use a preponderance of
the evidence standard in her probation revocation hearing.

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

Tellingly, Meyer cites no case—state or federal—that has so held. 6 Multiple courts have,
however, rejected that very argument. See United States v. Smith, 571 F.2d 370, 372 (7th
Cir. 1978); Dail, 610 P.2d at 1196; -see --also -------Colasuonno, 697 F.3d at 180-81 (applying
“reasonably satisfied” standard while recognizing “‘reasonably satisfied’ standard may
require less than preponderance of evidence”).
Moreover, a preponderance of the evidence standard places on the state a burden
more akin to a trial than the “informal hearing” with “informal procedural guarantees”
envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Morrissey. 408 U.S. at 483; see Smith, 571 F.2d
at 372 (noting preponderance standard would “force already overburdened district judges
to give probationers virtually a completely new trial of their violations”). That conflicts
with the state’s “overwhelming interest in being able to return the individual to
imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial if in fact he has failed
to abide by the conditions of his parole.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483. The interests of the

6

There are some jurisdictions that apply a preponderance of the evidence standard, but the
state has not found any case actually holding that it violates due process to apply something
other than a preponderance standard. For example, in United States v. Hooker, 993 F.2d
898 (D.C. Cir. 1993), because “[t]he government favor[ed] the preponderance standard—
even over the reasonably satisfied test,” the D.C. Circuit “agree[d] with the government
that the preponderance of the evidence standard, incorporated in the district court rule, is
appropriate, if not necessarily constitutionally required, and that it is certainly adequate to
protect a defendant’s due process rights.” Id. at 900; see also, e.g., United States v. Bujak,
347 F.3d 607, 609 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding preponderance of the evidence standard applies
in probation revocation hearings because it already applied, by statute, in supervised
release revocation hearings).
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state and the interests of the probationer are more appropriately balanced with an “informal
hearing,” id. at 486, in which the “district court need only be ‘reasonably satisfied’ that a
probationer has failed to comply with the conditions of probation to revoke sentence.”
Colasuonno, 697 F.3d at 181; see Smith, 571 F.2d at 372 (“A stricter standard could often
result in poor risk convicted felons remaining at large and thus be against the public
interest.”).
Meyer also claims that due process requires a preponderance of the evidence
standard for probation revocation hearings because that is the standard in parole revocation
hearings in Idaho. (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) But preponderance of the evidence is the
standard in parole revocation hearings in Idaho because of a statute, see I.C. § 20-229B,
not because due process requires it. The legislature, who is free to set the standard of proof
far above what due process requires, has not chosen to do the same for probation revocation
hearings. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, 20-222.
2. Meyer Cannot Show That Any Error In Applying The Substantial Evidence
Standard Plainly Exists
Under the second prong of fundamental error review, Meyer must prove that the
alleged error “plainly exists.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. An error only
plainly exists if, at the time the error was made, it was “clear or obvious.” Id. This
“necessitates a showing by the appellant that existing authorities have unequivocally
resolved the issue in the appellant’s favor.” State v. Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, 375, 271 P.3d
1227, 1231 (Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis in original). Meyer cannot make that showing here
because, as she concedes, “this Court has not articulated the degree of proof that will satisfy
the court” in a probation revocation hearing. (Appellant’s brief, p.9.)
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Idaho appellate courts have held that, for a probation revocation hearing, “proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is not required.” State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d
253, 256 (2007) (emphasis added). But neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any Idaho
appellate court has specified the standard of proof that is required—or disavowed the use
of the substantial evidence standard. Indeed, Meyer has not cited a single case from any
jurisdiction—state or federal—that has held that application of a substantial evidence
standard in a probation revocation hearing violates due process. Meyer thus cannot show
that any error in the district court’s use of the substantial evidence standard was “plain.”
Hadden, 152 Idaho at 375, 271 P.3d at 1231 (holding alleged error in use of jury instruction
“was not ‘plain’” where “Idaho appellate courts have never disavowed the use of this
instruction”).
3. Meyer Cannot Show That Any Error In Applying The Substantial Evidence
Standard Was Not Harmless
Under the third prong of fundamental error review, Meyer must prove that the
alleged error “was not harmless.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. An error is
not harmless only if it “affected the outcome” of the probation revocation hearing. Perry,
150 Idaho at 225, 245 P.3d at 977. Meyer cannot show the alleged error affected the
outcome here because she cannot show that application of the preponderance standard
affects the outcome of the hearing.
The evidence presented at the probation revocation hearing was that Meyer
admitted that she stopped taking her prescription medication, which violated a condition
of her probation. Meyer’s own father, with whom Meyer lived, testified that Meyer was
on antidepressant prescription medication (Tr., p.33, Ls.13-17), that he had multiple
conversations with her about the prescription medication (Tr., p.36, Ls.8-14), and that she
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told him she was not taking the prescription medication (Tr., p.36, Ls.15-17). Meyer’s
probation officer also testified that Meyer was on prescription medication (Tr., p.40, Ls.1924), that, around June 2016, Meyer “stated that she was not taking it and she didn’t need
mental health medications,” (Tr., p.40, Ls.19-24), that, in September 2016, Meyer told him
again that she was not taking her prescription medication (Tr., p.42, Ls.11-25), and that
Meyer said “she had no intention of taking them,” (Tr., p.43, Ls.1-4).
The testimony from Meyer’s father and probation officer that she admitted she was
not taking her prescription medication was corroborated by the testimony about her
behavior. Meyer’s father testified that, starting around June 2016, Meyer changed from
being “normal” where she “could comprehend” to a state where “[s]he couldn’t
comprehend anything” and she “just wasn’t herself.” (Tr., p.33, L.23 – p.34, L.16; p.36,
Ls.1-7.) Meyer’s probation officer similarly testified that, in June 2016, Meyer “did not
properly communicate . . . as if she wasn’t even there mentally.” (Tr., p.40, Ls.2-11.) He
also testified that, in September 2016, she behaved “[s]imilar” and that “she was unstable
and mentally not coherent.” (Tr., p.41, Ls.4-6; p.42, Ls.11-18; p.43, Ls.9-15.)
Meyer argued at the revocation hearing “that her state of mind on September 13th
supports that she did not have the mental capacity” to willfully stop taking her medications.
(Tr., p.56, Ls.20-23.) But her probation officer testified that Meyer admitted she was not
taking her medications as early as June (Tr., p.40, Ls.19-24). Moreover, as the district
court found, Meyer’s direct statements that she was not taking medication and had no
intention of doing so, which were made on or around September 13th, showed that Meyer
had the mental capacity to make the decision to stop taking the medication. (Tr., p.56, L.20
– p.57, L.22; see
- Tr., p.42, L.11 – p.43, L.4.)
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The testimony of Meyer’s father and probation officer that Meyer admitted she
stopped taking her prescription medication, coupled with their corroborating testimony
about her behavior, was sufficient to find, even by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Meyer willfully stopped taking her prescription medications. The district court’s alleged
error in applying a substantial evidence standard was thus harmless. State v. Almaraz, 154
Idaho 584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2011) (error harmless where “the result would be the
same without the error”).
On appeal, Meyer argues that, had the district court applied a preponderance
standard, “there is a very reasonable probability that the court would not have found the
violation” because the state did not sufficiently prove Meyer knew she had to take her
prescription medication as a condition of her probation. (Appellant’s brief, p.10.) That
cannot be true. Meyer’s knowledge of her probation condition was not a contested issue
at the hearing, and thus not something the district court addressed under any standard. (See
Tr., p.55, L.11 – p.58, L.16.) Even if the district court had applied a preponderance
standard, its analysis still would have focused on what Meyer agreed was the only contested
issue: whether Meyer had the mental capacity to willfully violate her probation condition.
(See Tr., p.52, L.25 – p.55, L.2.) And, as discussed above, the evidence proves the
probation violation, even under a preponderance of the evidence standard.
In any event, Meyer waived the theory that she lacked knowledge of the probation
condition by failing to raise it in the district court. See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162
Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (holding theory not argued in district court “is
not properly before this Court on appeal”). Her decision not to claim in the district court
that she was unaware of her probation condition is understandable, given that Meyer signed
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the district court’s order spelling out her conditions “to certify that I have read or had read
to me and fully understand and accept all the conditions, regulations and restrictions under
which I am being granted probation.” (Aug., p.7. 7) Had Meyer raised any issue with
respect to her knowledge of her probation conditions at the hearing, the state could have
easily refuted the argument with the probation order signed by Meyer, which serves as
dispositive evidence that she knew and understood the conditions of her probation. See
State v. Reine, 122 Idaho 928, 930, 841 P.2d 458, 460 (Ct. App. 1992) (“This Court has
held that a defendant’s signature on a probation order indicates he accepted, and certified
that he fully understood, the conditions of probation.”). Having failed to assert that theory
in the district court, Meyer cannot take advantage of a so-called lack of evidence rebutting
that theory on appeal. See Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at ___, 396 P.3d at 705 (“It is
manifestly unfair for a party to go into court and slumber, as it were, on his defense . . . and
[then] seek to present his defense, that was never mooted before, to the judgment of the
appellate court.”).
Meyer also makes much of the fact that neither her father nor the probation officer
knew the brand name of the prescription drug and claims the state’s evidence that she was
on prescription drugs was “very weak.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.4, 10.) That ignores that
Meyer’s condition of probation requiring her to take her prescription medications was not
limited to any specific brands. (See R., p.45.) She was required “to take all medication
prescribed at the rate it is prescribed.” (Id. (emphasis added)). And while Meyer’s father

7

Contemporaneous with the filing of this brief, the state has filed a motion to augment the
record with a copy of the original order placing Meyer on probation that was signed by
Meyer and her probation officer. A copy of that order, without the signatures, is already
in the record. (R., pp.42-50.)
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did not know and Meyer’s probation officer was not certain what brand of medication
Meyer had been prescribed, they unequivocally testified that she had been prescribed
medication. (See Tr., p.33, Ls.13-22; p.40, Ls.19-24.) Not only would it be reasonable to
infer that her father and probation officer knew she was on prescription medication because
of their relationship to her, both witnesses also testified that they actually discussed the
prescription medication with Meyer. (Tr., p.36, Ls.8-10; p.42, L.11 – p.43, L.4.) The
evidence shows, even by a preponderance standard, that Meyer had been prescribed
medication.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Meyer’s appeal as moot or,
in the alternative, affirm the district court’s order revoking Meyer’s probation.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2018.
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